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JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAYt

Lawyers inform, guide, recommend, and advise. Clients decide and
act. Most times, at least in my experience as outside corporate counsel,
the principals of a business client are grateful for legal counsel's
expertise and skills as a component of their planning and decisionmaking. As a result, the client and its agents act in accordance with legal
counsel's suggestions on how the business should move forward
legally-and ethically.
Sometimes, however, business entity clients and their principals do
not seek, accept, or heed the advice of their lawyers. In fact, sometimes,
they expressly disregard a lawyer's instructions on how to proceed. In
certain cases, the client expressly rejects the lawyer's advice. However,
some business constituents who take action contrary to the advice of
legal counsel may fall out of compliance incrementally over time or
signal compliance and yet (paradoxically) act in a noncompliant manner.
These seemingly ineffectual varieties of the lawyer/client relationship are
frustrating to the lawyer.

&

f Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College
of Law. Before joining the faculty at The University of Tennessee College of Law in
2000, I practiced business law in the Boston office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
Flom LLP for almost 15 years. Some of the facts, concerns, and observations shared in
this article derive from my experience in practice. My work on this article also benefitted
greatly from the research assistance of Katherine E. Smalley (The University of
Tennessee College of Law, J.D. 2016). Her help in identifying supporting citations for
my ideas and analysis is gratefully acknowledged.
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In most of the cases I have seen, business managers have not ignored
or disobeyed legal advice in order to violate law, non-legal duties, or
even norms. Rather, it seems that legal and ethical compliance is not, for
these folks, a priority. It is not part of their personal or professional
fabric-who they are or what they do. In some cases, one might observe
that the firm's operations or culture fail to value-or even devalueobedience with legal or ethical principles.
This short article aims to explain why representatives of business
entities who consider themselves law-abiding and ethical may
nevertheless act in contravention of the business's legal counsel and
offers preliminary means of addressing the proffered reasons for these
compliance failures. The article does not address willful noncompliance
or even willful blindness.' Rather, it makes observations about behavior
that falls squarely into what the law typically recognizes as recklessness. 2
An apocryphal lawyer-client story provides foundational context.
I. AN INTRODUCTORY TALE OF INSIDER TRADING NONCOMPLIANCE
A private law firm, Legal & Ethical, PLLC ("L&E"), has been
outside general counsel to a Delaware corporation, DEL Corporation
("DEL Corp."), for a number of years. DEL Corp.'s common stock
trades on the NASDAQ Global Market. In light of provisions in, among
other laws and regulations, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,3 the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 4 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,' the
1. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 768-771
(2011); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability and Tippee
Liability: SACS, Steven Cohen, and the Court's Opinion in Dirks, 15 TRANSACTIONS 47,
54 (2013) ("Willful blindness is addressed under the criminal law doctrine of conscious
avoidance, which may support a conviction on the basis of willful misconduct."); J. Kelly
Strader, (Re)ConceptualizingInsider Trading: UnitedStates v. Newman and the Intent to
Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REv. 1419, 1447 (2015) ("The MPC and common law both
provide that, when proof of knowledge is an element of a crime, proof that the defendant
was willfully blind will suffice.").
2. See Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 770 ("[A] reckless defendant is one who ... knows
of a substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing").
3. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)),
amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988 (part of Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988), Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff), and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3,
78ff).
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 8B2.1, 8B2.4(a), 8C4.11 (2012).
5. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,6 and the
evolution of the fiduciary duty of loyalty under Delaware corporate law,
L&E recommends that DEL Corp. adopt a code of ethics and a series of
compliance policies and procedures, constituting an overarching legal
and ethical compliance program tailored to the firm and its business. 8
L&E advises DEL Corp. that this customized compliance program will
put the firm in the best position to argue for dismissal of or favorable
treatment in legal or regulatory actions against the firm alleging
noncompliance. 9 DEL Corp. retains L&E to construct this compliance
program.
The program includes a securities trading policy designed to, among
other things, curtail conduct in connection with securities transactions
that may violate rules prohibiting insider tradinglo and other securities
fraud cognizable as deceptive conduct under Section 10(b) ("Section
10(b)") of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended ("1934
Act")," and Rule lOb-5 ("Rule lOb-5") adopted by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") under Section 10(b). 12 L&E drafts

&

6. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.dodd-frank-act.us.
7. See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006); In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78 (1963).
8. This advice is now commonplace. As one pair of commentators have written:
"[I]t is organizational suicide not to have a corporate compliance plan." Pamela H. Bucy
& Anthony A. Joseph, Conducting Business in the Twenty-First Century: How to Avoid
OrganizationalSuicide (Part1), 70 ALA. L. REV. 184, 185 (2009) (footnote omitted).
This was not true two decades ago. It is today for every business, from large, publiclyowned companies, to small, closely-held family businesses. Among other things, this
means that any lawyer who advises a business client without ensuring that the client has
an effective, updated, corporate compliance plan risks committing legal malpractice.
9. This value of compliance programs is widely cited. See Bucy & Joseph, supra
note 8, at 188 ("[E]ffective corporate compliance plans are now a necessity for every
business."); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 72 ("A firm wants its employees to
be sensitive to legal requirements in order to minimize the threat of legal sanctions and
reputational harm that it faces when a violation occurs.").
10. For information about insider trading compliance plans, see John P. Anderson,
Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From Trading Plan Crisis to
Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339 (2015); John P. Anderson, Solving the Paradox
of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 273 (2016) [hereinafter "Paradox"];
Richard S. Gruner, Lean Law Compliance: Confronting and Overcoming Legal
Uncertainty in Business Enterprisesand Other Complex Organizations, 11 N.Y.U. J.L.
Bus. 247, 261-70 (2014); Marc I. Steinberg & John Fletcher, Compliance Programsfor
Insider Trading, 47 SMU L. REV. 1783 (1994).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2016).
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the securities trading policy and presents it to DEL Corp. for approval
and adoption.
The board reviews the policy at a regularly scheduled meeting.
Lawyers from L&E are present at the board meeting. The L&E lawyers
explain the objectives and operation of the policy to the board, noting
that the policy is constructed with clear prescriptions and proscriptions to
best ensure that the behavior of directors, officers, employees, and other
agents of DEL Corp. remains well within the bounds of the law (which
often can be quite complex in substance and in practical application) 13 as
a means of protecting both those individuals and DEL Corp. from
liability. The board approves and adopts the securities trading policy
after due discussion and deliberation. Among other things, the policy
prohibits directors, officers, employees, and other agents of DEL Corp.
from trading in DEL Corp.'s securities unless certain requirements are
met, and from disclosing material nonpublic information about DEL
Corp. and its operations and other activities to those without a need to
know the information (including DEL Corp.'s advisors and other agents).
The policy requires each director, officer, employee, and agent to sign an
annual acknowledgement of his or her understanding of and compliance
with the policy. A designated employee of DEL Corp. monitors
compliance with the acknowledgement requirement.
A few years after approval and adoption of the securities trading
policy, L&E represents DEL Corp. in a financing transaction with
another firm. Several months after the transaction closes, DEL Corp.
receives a letter of inquiry from the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc. ("FINRA"). 14 The letter includes a list of names and asks
whether DEL Corp.'s principals and advisors know anyone on the list. A
similar letter follows from the SEC. The letters also request that DEL
Corp. voluntarily produce certain documents in connection with the
inquiries. DEL Corp. asks L&E to assist it in responding to the letters of
inquiry and complying with the document production requests.

13. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on
Materiality Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REv. 999, 1016 (2012) ("Insider
trading compliance plans ... are ... crafted to be within the range of legal compliance.").
14. FINRA has assumed responsibility for insider trading surveillance, investigation
and enforcement with respect to equity securities listed with, among other markets, the
NASDAQ Stock Market. See Program for Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities
Pursuant to Rule 17d-2; Notice of Filing & Order Approving & Declaring Effective an
Amendment to the Plan for the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities Among Bats
Exch., Inc., Bats Y-Exchange, Inc., Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., Chicago Stock
Exch., Inc., Edga Exch., Inc., Edgx Exch., Inc., Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc.,
Nasdaq Omx Bx, Inc., Nasdaq Omx Phlx, Release No. 65991 (Dec. 16, 2011).
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The names on the lists in the letters do not, for the most part, look
familiar to L&E. However, in the course of the document production, an
attorney for L&E discovers a page from the desk calendar of the Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO") of DEL Corp. that proves to be significant.
Specifically, the calendar page for the day before the public
announcement of the financing includes the following notations:

Call:
[name of DEL Corp. division
manager]
[name of DEL Corp. division
manager]
[name of DEL Corp. division
manager]
[name of DEL Corp. division
manager]

general
general
general
general

[name of audit partner]
[name of HR firm principal]
[name unfamiliar to the reviewing attorney]
re: deal

The attorney reviewing the calendar page helped write the securities
trading policy, was part of the team that presented the policy to DEL
Corp.'s board of directors, and worked on the financing transaction. She
evaluated the list of names and quickly determined that the names she
recognized on the list all had a possible need to know about the
impending transaction the day before it was announced. She confirmed
that assessment with DEL Corp.'s CEO.
She then asked the CEO who the unfamiliar name was at the bottom
of the page, and what her relationship was to the financing. The CEO
replied that the last name on the page was a friend who was not involved

12

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

in the financing. He went on to offer, in response to further questioning,
that he had in fact called that friend the day before the financing was
publicly announced "just to let her know, because she's a supportive
friend," given that the transaction was a rather significant
accomplishment for the CEO and for DEL Corp.
The attorney-surprised (to say the least)-noted that the
communication between the CEO and the friend violated the terms of
DEL Corp.'s securities trading policy and could be a basis for insider
trading enforcement against both the CEO and DEL Corp.15 The CEOperhaps a bit less surprised, but concerned-quickly dismissed any
connection between his communication with his friend and any unlawful
conduct, asserting that the friend would never use that information to
trade or share the information with others. Yet, as additional facts would
later reveal, the friend did, in fact, trade in DEL Corp.'s common stock
based on the information conveyed to her that day by the CEO.
Ultimately, the friend and the CEO consented to the entry of a
permanent injunction against them that restrained and enjoined them
from committing further violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The
SEC ordered the friend to disgorge an amount equal to her illegal trading
profits and prejudgment interest on those profits and imposed financial
penalties on both the friend and the CEO. The SEC made the resulting
consent decree public through a press release, and local papers covered
the story. As a result, the standings of DEL Corp. and the CEO in the
local community were negatively affected (at least in the short term),
although the SEC never pursued an enforcement action against DEL
Corp. relating to the matter.

15. Section 21A of the 1934 Act authorizes the SEC to bring enforcement actions
against both violators of insider trading prohibitions and those who control them.
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any
provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or
selling a security . .. while in possession of material, nonpublic information in,
or has violated any such provision by communicating such information in
connection with, a transaction on or through the facilities of a national
securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, . . . the Commission
(A) may bring an action in a United States district court to seek, and the court
shall have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who
committed such violation; and
(B)may ...
bring an action in a United States district court to seek, and the
court shall have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty to be paid by a person
who, at the time of the violation, directly or indirectly controlled the person
who committed such violation.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(1) (2012).
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This story-at the intersection of law, ethics, and compliance-is
sobering. But it is familiar to many corporate legal advisors. Although
the actions of DEL Corp.'s CEO did not subject DEL Corp. to legal
action, DEL Corp. did incur legal expenses and sustain reputational
damage. The CEO suffered legal, financial, and reputational
consequences, although he did not admit liability and a court never
adjudicated the legality of his conduct. The public trading price of DEL
Corp.'s common stock declined significantly after the public
announcement of the consent decree. DEL Corp.'s business relationships
and the CEO's ability to generate those business relationships may have
been compromised, and DEL Corp.'s securities trading policy and
overall compliance plan-designed to protect both the firm and those
working for it from legal and ethical missteps-had failed. Diligent
counsel to businesses faced with facts similar to these must (and do) ask
themselves why this type of noncompliance occurs and whether there
was anything they could have done differently to avoid these undesired
results.
With those thoughts in mind, this short article reflects on the reckless
noncompliant business client and its principals-a client like DEL Corp.
with managers like the CEO. Executives like the CEO do not set out to
engage in misconduct or violate the law. What, then, prompts or
influences the principals of a firm that is represented zealously by
competent legal counsel to part ways with the letter or spirit of that
counsel's advice in a reckless manner? What factors may play a role?
Perhaps firm management fails to fully understand the advice the lawyer
has given. Maybe those who direct the firm's activities lack respect for
legal or ethical compliance. Alternatively, the firm's leaders may be
affected by cognitive biases or other personal or group attributes that
dictate their managerial decisions and actions.
To explore these possibilities, the article proceeds by offering brief
observations on the potential contribution of each of these factors to
managerial noncompliance and, in each case, assessing whether
lawyering has the potential to make an impact. Specifically: Part II
addresses client comprehension; Part Il tackles respect for legal and
ethical advice, mandates, and concerns; and Part IV focuses on
behavioral psychology considerations. A brief conclusion follows in Part
V. The DEL Corp. story is referenced at various junctures to exemplify
or illustrate certain points.

14
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II. LACK OF ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING AS A FACTOR IN LEGAL
NONCOMPLIANCE

)

When a business firm or its principals fail to comply with law, it
seems relevant (if not obvious) to ask whether the individuals who are
charged with assuring firm or personal compliance possessed sufficient
knowledge to avoid noncompliance. A lack of understanding of the law
may prevent an executive considering a course of action from properly
assessing the liability risk for herself and for the firm.16 Negligence or
reckless malfeasance may result.
Laws applicable in the business context (as in other contexts) can be
appreciably complex. Legal advisors to business firms and their
principals are charged with translating that complexity into guidance to
firm management in a variety of advisory contexts"--e.g., board
meetings, communications with officers and employees, governance and
business policies, client memoranda, opinion letters, and transactional
legal drafting. "[C]omplex legal environments, coupled with complex
business conduct carried out amidst these environments, can produce
considerable compliance planning difficulty and legal uncertainty."
For example, the introductory tale relating to DEL Corp.' 9 involves
executive officer conduct that engages insider trading enforcement.
Firms with publicly traded securities tend to proactively engage in
compliance activities to protect themselves and their employees against
potential liability relating to securities trading activities, including insider
trading. 20 These activities typically include (as they did for DEL Corp. 21
the adoption of a securities trading policy as part of the firm's overall
legal compliance program.22
16. Cf Richard S. Gruner, Lean Law Compliance: Confronting and Overcoming
Legal Uncertainty in Business Enterprises and Other Complex Organizations, 11 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Bus. 247, 260 (2014) ("II]mperfect perceptions of legal requirements and related
company actions can produce large gaps in compliance planning capabilities and create
associated legal uncertainties."); Jeff Zalesin, How to Explain Complex CapitalMarkets
Issues to A Client, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:03 PM EST) ("[A]n under-informed client
could end up damaging the transaction or stumbling into a new source of liability.").
17. Zalesin, supra note 16.
18. Gruner, supra note 16, at 259.
19. See supra Part I.
20. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
21. See supra Part I.
22. See Jeffrey A. Fiarman & Kenneth B. Wallach, 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING
BETwEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 52:70, 2015 ed. ("Although it does not absolve
an employee from being subject to Rule lOb-5, practically all publicly-traded companies
have adopted a securities trading policy for their respective directors, officers and
employees which require their employees not to trade in the securities of the company if
they are in possession of material, nonpublic information."); Jay A. Dubow & John
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In general, a firm's securities trading policy establishes policies and
procedures relating to management (director, officer, partner, etc.) and
employee trading in securities of the firm or securities of other business
entities with whom the firm may. be involved (depending on the firm's
business).2 3 Public companies,4 broker/dealers and other financial
intermediaries, 25 law firms, 26 and accounting firmS 2 7 all typically have
securities trading policies covering insider trading. In each case, these
policies are designed to give clear guidance and (as L&E noted in its
board presentation for DEL Corp. ) ensure that those who act in
accordance with the policy are conducting their activities within the
bounds of the law.29
Achieving the aspired-for clarity in a securities trading policy is
challenging, however. The law of insider trading is complex, and
reducing its component parts to unambiguous client proscriptions and
prescriptions often seems like an illusory goal.30 Concepts that are
unclear or unsettled in U.S. insider trading law under Section 10(b) and
Rule lob-5 (including, for example, materiality and scienter 31) are
Shasanmi, The Importance of Having and Following A Strong Public Company Insider
Trading Policy, BUS. L. TODAY, October 2011, at 1, 3 ("Companies should institute
policies governing trading of their securities by officers, directors, employees, and others
with inside information (insiders), targeted at preventing trades at times when insiders
may be in possession of material nonpublic information.").
23. Id
24. See, e.g., Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 10, at 1828-30; Dubow & Shasanmi,
supra note 22.
25. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g) (2012); Insider Trading Compliance Programs, 28
No. 3 CORP. COUNS. QUARTERLY ART. 5 (July 2012); Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood,
With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds,
How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 357, 408-39 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt et al., Law Firm Policies RegardingInsider Trading and
Confidentiality, 47 Bus. LAw. 235 (1991); Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 10, at 180028.
27. Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 10, at 1794-1800.
28. See supra Part I.
29. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
30. See Gruner, supra note 16, at 261-65 (describing the sources of uncertainty in
insider trading law that confound successful legal compliance efforts).
31. See, e.g., Anderson, Paradox, supra note 10, at 287-88 ("[I]t is generally
understood that issuers' employees violate the law against insider trading when they seek
to benefit by trading (or tipping) on the basis of material nonpublic information in
violation of some 'fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence.' . . . But ...
crucial elements of this definition (e.g., materiality . . . and mental state) remain
uncertain."); Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 330, 355 (2013) ("[A]s insider trading liability theories become more exotic,
. . there may be some question as to the ability of ordinary retail investors to engage in
the increasingly sophisticated duty, materiality, and scienter analyses needed to determine

16
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especially difficult to convey.32 Even experienced lawyers struggle with
this task. It is important to note that securities trading policies have
certain standard terms and provisions, but they are customized to best
insure compliance for each firm and for specific constituents within the
firm. 34 The better the drafter knows the firm, the more customized the
policy can be. Yet, in many cases, in-house counsel (who should know
the firm best) may be overburdened or may not have the expertise or
experience to draft a tailored, substantively comprehensive securities
trading policy. Accordingly, outside counsel (who may not know the
firm as well) often are called upon to draft securities trading policies for
their public company clients.35 In these circumstances, close
communication between a firm's outside and in-house counsel can be
critical to the construction of an appropriate securities trading policy for
the firm-one that is both suitably protective and well understood by
those tasked with compliance.
Understanding and complying with a securities trading policy at its
adoption is just the beginning, however. It is in the firm's ongoing
operations that the suitability and clarity of the policy are tested. For
example, the CEO in the DEL Corp. story36 may well have understood
the compliance policy at the time the board of directors adopted it. But
he may not have comprehended its applicability in the context of his
communications with others on the day before the announcement of the
whether a particular contemplated trade would violate the law."); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Martha Stewart and the ForbiddenFruit: A New Story ofEve, 2009 MiCH.
ST. L. REv. 1017, 1032 (2009) (noting that two of "my favorite unclear aspects of U.S.
insider trading doctrine under current law" are materiality and scienter).
32. See Anderson, Paradox, supra note 10, at 287 ("I]n the absence of any clear
legal definition of insider trading, vagueness, uncertainty, and controversy surround the
question of precisely what conduct is proscribed by the law. This state of affairs places
issuers in an awkward position. . . . [H]ow can issuers implement policies to reliably
prevent conduct that is not defined with any specificity?").
33. See id ("There are a number of insider trading control mechanisms employed by
issuers; they include (1) a published ban on any trading in an issuer's shares based on
material nonpublic information (i.e., self-policing), (2) requiring preclearance for trading,
and (3) the imposition of 'blackout periods."') (footnotes omitted).
34. See, e.g., Dubow & Shasanmi, supra note 22, at 3 ("Policies and procedures are
not one-size fits all and covered entities should develop individual policies and
procedures that are tailored to their specific operation, industry and employee base.");
Steinberg & Fletcher, supra note 10, at 1832 ("The policy for high-level officials should
provide a more detailed treatment of the basis for prohibitions on insider trading than the
policy provided to all employees. For example, the policy may provide examples that
such officials will be more likely to encounter than the average employee.").
35. See Fiarman & Wallach, supra note 22, at § 52:65 (recommending seeking the
advice of outside counsel regarding securities law compliance).
36. See supra Part I.
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financing transaction. By the time the financing transaction occurred,
several years had passed. Although the CEO was required to
acknowledge his understanding and compliance with the securities
trading policy on an annual basis, his actual comprehension of the policy
is only tested in context.
The overall success of a securities trading policy depends not only on
a clear, comprehensible, bespoke policy, but also on a well-executed,
ongoing plan for ensuring that the carefully constructed terms and
provisions of the policy are observed in practice. 3 7 Reflecting on the
38
DEL Corp. story, it is likely that an annual acknowledgement, while
necessary, is insufficient to ensure compliance with a securities trading
(or other similarly complex) policy. Additional means of identifying and
closing gaps in understanding (including, for example, specialized
contextual training or communicationS 39) may be required.
III. LACK OF RESPECT FOR LEGAL AND ETHICAL ADVICE, MANDATES,
AND CONCERNS

In my 15 years as a full-time business law practitioner, I represented
a number of clients managed by people who somewhat openly expressed
negative views on-even disdain for-legal rules and the lawyering task,
as well as basic tenets of business ethics. 40 I am not alone. Others also
37. See Pamela Bucy Pierson & Anthony A. Joseph, Creatingan Effective Corporate
Compliance Plan:Part11, 72 ALA. L. REv. 284 (2011):
An effective corporate compliance plan consists of steps taken by a business
to inform its employees, executives and directors about the laws that apply to
them when executing their business duties; to encourage law-abiding
behavior by its personnel; to establish protocols for detecting as early as
possible any violations of the law committed within the business; and to deal
appropriately with any violations that may occur.
Id.; Insider Trading Compliance Programs, supra note 25 ("Corporate counsel also can
assist the company by disseminating the insider trading policy, educating corporate
insiders of its procedures, and administering the policy once it is implemented.").
38. See supra Part I.
39. See, e.g., Pierson & Joseph, supranote 37, at 286:
Compliance training should be provided for all personnel and, in some
instances, third parties who work with a company.... Because people learn
in different ways, effective compliance training should be presented through
a variety of methods: oral presentations, written materials, interactive and
video sessions, role-playing, demonstrations, and question-and-answer
sessions.
Id. A recent study finds that ethics education may improve the accessibility of ethical
dimensions of behavior. See Kurt Wurthmann, A Social Cognitive Perspective on the
Relationships Between Ethics Education, Moral Attentiveness, and PRESOR, 114 J. Bus.

ETmcs 131 (2013).
40. The concept of business ethics may require definition:
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have observed this state of affairs. 4 1 Despite legal counsel's best
intentions and business-enabling conduct, a business client's
management may view the law, the lawyers bound to uphold it, or
applicable ethical principles as impediments to business-friction in the
gears of commerce.4 2
Disrespect for the law, lawyers, and business ethics may result in
irresponsible business conduct-behavior that evidences a reckless
disregard for legal and ethical compliance. A business manager's
calculus of legal and ethical compliance benefits and costs becomes
skewed; management personnel may fail to appreciate legal or ethical

Ethics in business is basically no different from ethics in policing, rocket
science, or ordinary everyday life. While there may be particular ethical
problems typical of the business and financial world, the most important part of
ethics is universal: be honest, do not cheat, be trustworthy, be prudent, be
concerned about the well-being of others, and so forth.
James G. Murphy, People in Business: Context and Character, in LEADERSHIP AND

BusiNEss ETHICS 117, 124 (Gabriel Flynn, ed. 2008). Although some professions
(including, e.g., law) have codified rules of professional responsibility that provide a
framework for key ethical conduct, business ethics are defined in a less structured way:
There is no special code of business ethics; rather, there are questions and
dilemmas about remuneration, whistle-blowing, product safety and so on,
which arise mainly in the course of business activity, but which can be dealt
with in terms of moral principles. And there are values which we intuitively
recognise as such. Honesty, reliability, just and fair dealing are recognised as
correct behaviour, just as lying, cheating, stealing, cowardice and
irresponsibility are recognised as incorrect behaviour. Breaking agreements,
treating people unjustly, telling lies, taking more than one's due are wrong - in
business as in any other aspect of life.
David Smith & Louise Drudy, Corporate Culture and Organisational Ethics, in
LEADERSHIP AND BusINESs ETHIcs, supra, at 165, 168. Ethical business activities nay
include legal compliance, but they are not limited to legally compliance conduct:
An ethic of law-observance is not enough, and takes no imagination. The
drawing-out or explication of an ethic that would be in some way admirable to
both people in business and those in other walks of life, yet clearly grounded in
business experience, should be the goal of... ongoing dialogue.
Murphy, supra, at 129.
41. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 40, at 127 (noting that business participants may
"dismiss ethics as soft-hearted and therefore irrelevant to their world.").
42. See, e.g., Craig D. Galli, A Compliance Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste:
Counsel's Role to Enhance Corporate Culture, 30 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 1, 3 (Winter 2016):
The dysfunctional compliance approach of some companies can be best
described as a pervasive attitude of defiance. . . . [D]isdain for regulators and
governing regulations may be palpable at every organizational level. . . . One
commentator described companies with a pervasive disrespect for the law and
ethical standards as a Wild West "Yahoo Culture."
Id. (Citations omitted).
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constraints on their business-related activities.4 3 Illegal or unethical
conduct may result. In short, business actors must care about compliance
with legal and ethical precepts if they are to properly prioritize them in
their decision-making processes and activities and avoid the penalties
associated with failed compliance.
Although much has been written about this in the past 15 years
(especially since public revelations of financial and other business fraud
at and involving Enron Corporation and other public companies at the
outset of the new millennium), the phenomenon is not new. More than a
quarter of a century ago, one commentator observed that:
Many of our corporate giants reap substantial profits from a
callous disregard of their highly proclaimed interest in the
consumer, the public, and the environment. Likewise, many
flaunt the laws of the very government of the United States that
has provided them the freedom under which capitalism can
operate. .. [I]t is rare that a top corporate executive condemns
unethical corporate 9ractices or even gross violations of law in
the corporate world.
The extent to which firm management disregards legal or ethical
requirements as unnecessary or counterproductive to the profitable
conduct of business may be debated. But the phenomenon has been
observed and studied.
How might all of this relate to our insider trading scenario at DEL
Corp.? 45 The conduct of DEL Corp.'s CEO may be understood as a
manifestation of his attitude toward insider trading law, business
lawyers, ethical business practices, or the legal and ethical compliance
process. Accordingly, he may have engaged in a faulty cost-benefit
43. Adam Smith, often cited for (among other things) his advocacy of free-market
capitalism in the pursuit of self-interest, understood that legal and ethical considerations
factor into business conduct:
Smith states very clearly, people should work to advance their own interests.
"Every man ... is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way,
and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any
other man, or order of men." But where the ellipses appear in the above
quotation, he adds the constraint, seldom quoted . . . "as long as he does not
violate the laws of justice." That means justice considerations are the limit to
any self-interested pursuit.
Ronald Duska & Julie Anne Ragatz, How Losing Soul Leads to Ethical Corruption in
Business, in LEADERSHIP ANDBUSINESS ETHIcs, at 151,'158 (footnote omitted).
44. MARSHALL BARRON CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER

161 (1990).
45. See supra Part I.

20

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

analysis when he disclosed information about the financing transaction to
his friend. He may have discounted the importance of insider trading
law, the advice of the firm's lawyers regarding the need for strict and
sustained compliance, or the significance of related ethical issues.
Moreover, he may have depreciated the value of his role in ensuring
DEL Corp.'s overall legal and ethical compliance. As a result, the CEO
may have failed to properly comprehend the extent to which his conduct
imperiled both himself and DEL Corp. It is important to note in this
regard that, when questioned about the inappropriate disclosures he made
to his friend, the CEO expressed confidence that she would not use the
information about the transaction to trade in DEL Corp.'s securities or tip
others who might do the same.
Commentators have suggested a number of approaches to combating
management contempt for-or indifference to-business law, lawyers,
and ethics. Among the recommendations: tougher, targeted legal
enforcement; 46 enhanced education and training; 4 7 and the institution of
governance, reporting, and communication rules designed to better
ensure legal and ethical compliance. 48 If business managers (like the
CEO in the DEL Corp. story49) were better informed about and more
frequently reminded of the policy rationale for U.S. insider trading
regulation or at least the justification for the key elements of the firm's
securities trading policy, they may not only understand, but also
prioritize and value compliance with insider trading regulation.
Moreover, a business entity like DEL Corp. is well advised to assess the
completeness and effectiveness of its compliance systems and processes
and, if and as necessary, introduce new organizational structures and
mechanisms to enhance management respect for and attentiveness to
legal considerations, legal counsel,-and ethical principles.
46. See, e.g., Clinard, supra note 44 ("Stronger and more effective enforcement of
government relations may well be the best, and perhaps the only, recourse left to protect
our citizens and, fundamentally, our capitalist system.").
47. See, e.g., Duska & Ragatz, supra note 43, at 158-60 (focusing on business school
education in this regard).
48. See, e.g., David Smith & Louise Drudy, Corporate Culture and Organisational
Ethics, in LEADERSHIP AND BusiNESS ETmcs at 170-71 (describing representative
governance attributes in the healthcare industry); Leonard Bucklin, More Preaching,
Fewer Rules: A Processfor the CorporateLawyer's Maintenance of Corporate Ethics,
35 Omio N.U. L. REv. 887, 895 (2009) (suggesting that integrity in the business
associations setting may be enhanced through improved communication among
constituents); Sefa Hayibor & David M. Wasieleski, Effects of the Use of the Availability
Heuristic on Ethical Decision-Making in Organizations, 84 J. Bus. ETmcs 151 (2009)
(suggesting that increasing the availability of information about, e.g., the consequences of
unethical conduct may decrease the probability of unethical behavior).
49. See supraPart I.
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More broadly, disrespect or contempt for law, lawyers and ethics
may be seen as a sign of a dysfunctional corporate culture.50
Accordingly, other measures to enhance corporate culture also may be
successful in preventing reckless noncompliance. Legal counsel can
contribute meaningfully to efforts geared at enhancing corporate
culture.5 1
IV. BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS
Research from behavioral psychology has been used to explain and
predict the conduct of firm management in a variety of circumstances.
Commentators have applied this research to make salient observations
about the behavioral biases, heuristics, and other cognitive impairments
of corporate directors and executives in the C-suite. This research and
commentary offer an additional possible explanation for reckless conduct
like that exhibited by the CEO in the DEL Corp. story.52 While a
complete survey of the relevant literature on human behavior is beyond
the scope of this article, a few key elements of that literature resonate
with common experience and provide valuable touchstones.
Most importantly, both anecdotal and empirical information reveals
that decision-makers may over-estimate their self-importance and exhibit
undue self-assurance in their judgments. This overconfidence is a
commonly observed cognitive bias:
Studies have shown that high percentages of people believe they
are better drivers, better teachers, better eyewitnesses, better
auditors, and on and on, than their peers. Students, psychologists,
CIA agents, engineers, stock analysts, financial analysts,
investment bankers, investors, and many other categories of
people have been studied and shown to tend toward irrational
confidence *in the accuracy of their decisions. . . . [P]eople's
overconfidence in their own decision making extends to their
ethical judgments. People tend to believe not only that they are
above average in driving and teaching but also that they are more
honest and fair-minded than both their competitors and their
peers. 5 3

50. See Galli, supranote 42, at 3.
51. Id. at 4-5 (identifying five ways in which legal counsel can help a business client
improve its culture).
52. See supra Part I.
53. Robert A. Prentice, Ethical Decision Making: More Needed Than Good
Intentions, 63 FiN. ANALYSTS J. 17, 20 (2011).
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Overconfidence may result in inadequate consideration of the legal or
ethical ramifications of, or risks associated with, proposed conduct or an
inaccurate assessment of the probability that those ramifications or risks
may occur. 54
Specifically, when making decisions with legal or ethical
components, the overconfidence bias may manifest in a belief that,
because one is a person of integrity, one always takes the moral course of
action.5 ' The predictable result is decreased diligence in thought and
action as a precursor to decision making. This unquestioning approach
may increase the likelihood of illegal or unethical conduct.
Along similar lines, executives may exhibit an optimism bias.56 They
may give undue credence to a favorable view or outcome in their
decision-making. As one prominent author on the subject notes, "This
overoptimism may be evolutionarily beneficial . . . but irrational

optimism can lead to systematic errors in decision making, and in some
circumstances, it can induce unethical conduct.", 7
A 2011 article for the American Bar Association's Business Law
Today describes a relevant manifestation of the optimism bias in insidertrading contexts like the one involving DEL Corp.'s CEO: 8
Most people's natural tendencies make them inclined to believe
the best about people, especially those with whom they are
closest and who they trust the most. Ironically, because the
showing of a close, personal relationship is frequently sufficient
to show the intent to convey a benefit, friends and family
members pose the greatest potential risk to corporate insiders
54. Professor Cass Sunstein has labeled the tendency to ignore probability
assessments in certain risk analyses "probability neglect." See Cass R. Sunstein,
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 63 (2002)
("When people neglect probability they may . . . treat some risks as if they were
nonexistent, even though the likelihood of harm, over a lifetime, is far from trivial.").
55. See Prentice, supra note 53, at 20 ("Overconfidence in their own moral compass
often leads people to make decisions that have significant ethical implications without
engaging in any serious reflection. They 'know' that they are good people and are
confident in their instinctive judgments.").
56. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias, 21 CuRRENT BIoLOGY R941, R944 (2011)
("[OJptimism has been linked to achievement in education, business, sport and electoral
politics.").
57. Prentice, supra note 53, at 20. See also Sharot, supra note 56, at R944 (noting the
positive adaptive effects of optimism bias, while at the same time cautioning that
"[u]nderestimating risk may reduce precautionary behaviour . . . . It could potentially
promote harmful behaviours . . . due to the optimistic assumptions that unwanted future
outcomes .. . are unlikely to materialize and that positive future outcomes ... are.").
58. See supra Part I.
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and service providers who confide confidential corporate
information in them.59
An insider may be less guarded in sharing material nonpublic
information with family members, friends, and other trusted people in his
or her sphere of influence (e.g., financial advisors, personal accountants,
and other professional), resulting in reckless violations of Section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5.
DEL Corp.'s CEO 60 may well have been both overconfident in his
moral character and overoptimistic in his assessment of the legal and
ethical effects of disclosing information the forthcoming DEL Corp.
financing with his friend. The path to combatting overconfidence and
overoptimism is somewhat unclear. Ensuring the CEO receives
information that contradicts the CEO's overly confident and overly
optimistic assessments intuitively should result in better decisionmaking, 61 but studies show that may not in fact always be the case. In
particular, although researchers recommend informational solutions to
mitigate overconfidence,6 2 it may be difficult to overcome optimism bias
with counterfactual information.
V. CONCLUSION

When a business lawyer provides information, guidance,
recommendations, and advice to a client, the lawyer facilitates legaland often ethical-compliance. This is key to the lawyer's task as an
advisor, as established under applicable rules of professional

59. Dixie L. Johnson & Robert Greffenius, Insider Trading by Friends and Family:
When the SEC Alleges Tipping, Bus. L. TODAY (Aug. 18 2011), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/b1t/content/2011/08/article-johnson-greffenius.shtml.
60. See supra Part I.
61. See, e.g., MICHAEL A BISHOP & J. D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 151-52 (2005) (describing the "consider-theopposite" de-biasing strategy); STEPHEN P. ROBBINS, DECIDE AND CONQUER: THE
ULTIMATE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING YOUR DECISION MAKING 174-75 (2d ed. 2015) ("When

we overtly consider various ways we could be wrong, we challenge our tendencies to
think we're smarter than we actually are.").
62. See, e.g., Andrew L. Zacharakis & Dean A. Shepherd, The Nature ofInformation
and Overconfidence on Venture Capitalists'DecisionMaking, 16 J. Bus. VENTURING
311, 326 (2001) (proposing "the use of counterfactual thinking, the 'humbling effect,'
and decision aids" for this purpose).
63. See, e.g., Sharot, supra note 56, at R943 ("[An optimism bias is maintained in
the face of disconfirming evidence because people update their beliefs more in response
to positive information about the future than to negative information about the future").
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responsibility.6 A lawyer owes his or her client important duties 65 and
must perform the services rendered competently, promptly, and
diligently. 66 In general, the lawyer "should demonstrate respect for the
legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers
and public officials."67
In addressing compliance concerns, business entity counsel (in-house
and outside) can, should, and do assist their business entity clients in risk
assessment and management in the context of their representation.6 8 "The
'conception of the lawyer as a promoter of corporate compliance with
law emanates from the basic values of the legal profession.'" 69
Customized, well-drafted policies as part of a comprehensive compliance
program are essential to that effort.
Compliance policies and programs, taken alone, however, may be
insufficient to the task.70 Even a compliance policy constructed with the

64. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013) ("As
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal
rights and obligations and explains their practical implications."); id. at pmbl. 9 (noting
"the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests,
within the bounds of the law").
65. See, e.g., id at pmbl. 4 ("A lawyer should maintain communication with a client
concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating
to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law"); id at r. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."); id. r. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client."); id at r. 1.6 (regarding the confidentiality of "information
relating to the representation").
66. Id. at pmbl. 4 ("In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent,
prompt and diligent").
67. Id. at pmbl. 5.
68. See generally Z. Jill Barclift, Preventive Law: A Strategyfor Internal Corporate
Lawyers to Advise Managers of Their Ethical Obligations, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 31 (2008)

(outlining a proactive approach to corporate counsel's role in compliance and risk
management); Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary
Findings andNew Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465 (2008) (identifying
and describing various risk assessment and management roles of general counsel); Janet
Stidman Eveleth, Life As Corporate Counsel, MD. B.J., January/February 2004, at 18
(profiling Maryland corporate counsel and noting their role in "ensur[ing] company
compliance with all pertinent rules and regulations").
69. Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 989, 1012

(2007) (quoting American Bar Ass'n, Report of American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility).
70. See Prentice, supra note 53, at 19 (noting research findings indicating that
corporate codes of conduct cannot overcome the behavioral impact of corporate culture);
Linda K.

Treviflo et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J.
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advice of counsel provided in a manner consistent with obligations of
professional responsibility and generally acknowledged best practices
may not ensure compliance with applicable law and ethical standards.
Said another way, "even the best models for preventing corporate harms
cannot insulate a corporation from accidents and mistakes."7 1 Legal
counsel should ask why and endeavor to close the identified compliance
gap.
Based on the motivating story and observations set forth in this
article, legal counsel to business entities may want to consider some or
all of the following ways to better assure client compliance with
applicable legal and ethical rules:
0
O

O

Confirm that compliance policies are written in as clear and
accessible a manner as possible; 72
Work with the client to develop tailored training programs and
communication strategies to enhance understanding and ongoing
awareness of the law, the firm's related policies, and the value of
law, lawyers, and ethics to the enterprise; 73
Develop and employ customized processes and information
targeted at counteracting executive over-confidence and overoptimism; 74

951, 971 (2006) (observing that "the impact of typical elements of ethics
infrastructures, such as corporate codes of ethics, appears to be minimal, at least in
isolation from more informal, culturally based and leadership-based efforts to foster
ethical behavior").
71. David C. Bauman, EvaluatingEthicalApproaches to Crisis Leadership: Insights
from UnintentionalHarm Research, 98 J. Bus. ETHICs 281 (2011).
72. See Johnson & Greffenius, supra note 59 ("insider trading policies should be
clear").
MANAGEMENT

73. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN A. CONRAD, MORALITY AND EcoNOMIc CRISIS: ENRON,
SUBPRIME AND

Co. (Diplomica Verlag, 2010) (discussing the necessity of ethics training);

A.K. GAVAI, BusiNEss ETHIcs 173 (Himalaya Publishing House, 2010) (arguing that
customized ethics training is essential to improve the awareness of ignorant or careless
managers); Johnson & Greffenius, supra note 59 ("insider trading policies should be . .
frequently circulated, . . . confidential documents should be marked as such and
distributed only to those who need to know the information, and . . clear warnings are
issued to people when they receive material nonpublic information from their
employer.").
74. For instance, expose executives over time to stories about compliance dilemmas
involving similarly situated firm managers that foster discussion about the tendency of
directors and officers to minimize or ignore risk because of over-confidence in their own
judgment or attributes and overly optimistic perceptions of relevant circumstances or
people.
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If personalized solutions are rejected as too costly or otherwise
impracticable, suggest generic options as a next-best set of
alternatives. 5

At the core of these recommendations is the idea that an ongoing,
routinized, thoughtful, client-focused approach to compliance has the
best probability of overcoming the potentially diverse barriers to legal
and ethical compliance-e.g., ignorance, disregard for legal or ethical
rules (or those who promote or enforce them), and cognitive biases.
Legal counsel is not, and cannot be, present for every decision made by
firm management in the course of the firm's business or the manager's
business-related personal decision making. Accordingly, the lawyer
needs to substitute consistent, reliable, robust processes for presence to
give the client the best chance of success in achieving more consistent
legal and ethical compliance.
Many compliance advocates and commentators also promote using
the threat of punishment to encourage compliance. However, traditional
behavioral motivations in the form of severe negative ramifications for
noncompliance may play a lesser role in guiding conduct that is
negligent or reckless than they do in incentivizing the compliance of
75. For example, wide circulation of a law firm client alert to directors and employees
(including officers) may provide accessible information that enhances client
understanding and related legal and ethical compliance. A King & Spalding client alert
notes, in summarizing, that "insider trading investigations frequently focus on executives
and managers who either unintentionally divulged material, nonpublic information or
who specifically told someone they were sharing information in confidence" and advises
executives to: "[a]void oversharing, even if it boosts your ego or calms your anxiety" and
"[i]f you feel you have overshared, make sure to reiterate that the information was
divulged in confidence and that it should not be used for trading." King & Spalding,
Client Alert, Special Matters & Government Investigations Practice Group, Friends and
Family: Keeping Loved Ones Safe from Insider Trading Temptations, Dec. 4, 2014, at 6,
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/cal204l4b.pdf
(Advising the periodic circulation of a similarly relevant current news article or other
short public media release among employees may have a similar effect). See, e.g., Peter
Siris, Insider trading is not always high-profile or intentional; it's important for
5,
2011),
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Apr.
employees
to
be
aware,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/insider-trading-not-high-profile-intentionalimportant-employees-aware-article- 1.112091.
76. See, e.g., Till Talaulicar, CorporateCodes of Ethics: Can Punishments Enhance
Their Effectiveness?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BusINEss ETHICs (Alexander
Brink, ed. 2011) (discussing the ability to improve compliance with internal disincentives
for violation); Treviflo et al., supra note 70, at 966 (noting studies that indicate "weak
sanctions can be worse for ethical behavior than no sanctions at all, in part because the
presence of sanctions makes it more likely that individuals will view a decision from
within a framework of narrowly business-driven thinking (in contrast to an ethical
decision-making framework).").
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willful wrongdoers acting in self-interest. Cost-benefit analyses may be
less clear and accurate in a negligent or reckless context given the
potential presence of some form of impaired cognition. It seems more
reasonable that a compliance-positive firm culture--one built on the
consistent and persistent encouragement of legal and ethical behavior
through understanding and awareness rather than the constant or episodic
fear of negative consequences for illegal or unethical conduct via
significant penalties-will succeed in minimizing careless or inadvertent
violations of legal or ethical principles. That observation
notwithstanding; it seems appropriate to note in closing that this is
undoubtedly a promising area for continued research and practical
innovations.

